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Montgomery and "Substantive" Rights Enforceable
Retroactively in State Post-Conviction Proceedings:
A Brief Reply to Professor Vazquez
Eric M. Freedman*
I thank Professor Vizquez for his truly valuable response to my article
proposing a definition of those newly-recognized "substantive" federal
constitutional rights that under Montgomery v. Louisiana' state courts must
recognize retroactively in their post-conviction proceedings.2
Having identified (I) several practical issues and (II) one doctrinal issue that I
left unaddressed, he has then gone on in most cases to suggest possible resolutions
of them.
This reply is so short because in large measure I agree with his points. Rather
than undermining my central thesis, I believe that they helpfully fill several gaps in
my original structure and indicate how courts and scholars might address any that
remain.
I. PRACTICALITIES

On the practical front, Professor Vizquez notes that in arguing that the right
to the benefits of Montgomery should be triggered by the recognition of a new
"substantive" constitutional right by the decision of a state's highest court, I did
not consider the possibility that the same argument would logically but
impractically apply to new constitutional law decisions of state intermediate
appellate courts, nor with how to deal with statute of limitations questions that may
arise if a state court recognizes a new rule before the Supreme Court does. As he
also notes similar questions arise now, and various pragmatic solutions, including
the judicious use of stays pending certiorari, are available to deal with them.
More substantively, he suggests that if the 'recognition of a new federal
constitutional right by a state supreme court (as opposed to the U.S. Supreme
Court) triggers a state's obligation to permit a state collateral attack on the new

Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016).
2 See Carlos M. Vazquez, The Scope of the ConstitutionalRight to CollateralRelief in State
Court, 18.2 OHIO ST. J. OF CRIM. L. 249 (2021) (responding to Eric M. Freedman, The Substance of
Montgotnery Retroactivity: The Definition of States' Supremacy Clause Obligationto Enforce Newly-

Recognized FederalRights in Their Post-ConvictionProceedingsand Why It Matters, 18.2
J. OF CRIM. L. 207 (2021)).
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will be
rule, the incentive of the Supreme Court to grant certiorari in such cases
increased, and thus my proposal might fail in its objective of increasing the
involvement of the states in the articulation of new federal rights in the criminal
context. 3
Professor Vizquez may be right, but there is no harm in trying. As things now
stand, states seeking certiorari frequently argue that their supreme courts have
over-extended the scope of constitutional rights and that the result will be a
massive disruption to their judicial systems. This argument sometimes works and
4
sometimes does not. Given the limited number of cases the Supreme Court
will be
accepts for review, the additional argument by the states that the disruption
to
addition
law-in
federal
increased because the state courts will as a matter of
rule
new
the
whatever state doctrines may apply-be required to apply
retrospectively would seem unlikely to make much difference in the rate of
certiorari grants.
II. DOCTRINE

My definition of the newly recognized federal constitutional rights that states
must enforce retroactively in state habeas proceedings derives from Supremacy
Clause thinking.
A. The ConstitutionalUnderpinningsof the Montgomery Mandate
6
But Professor Vazquez quite rightly says that the Supremacy Clause itself
does note create substantive rights; it is simply a command that courts enforce
whatever substantive rights federal law establishes. So, my proposal would benefit
from a more detailed discussion (more detailed than either he or I can indulge in on
this occasion) of the constitutional origins of Montgomery's mandate that the states
entertain habeas corpus petitions alleging violations of newly-arising "substantive"
7
federal constitutional rights.
There are at least two obvious candidates. Professor Vazquez suggests one in
his comment, and I respond here by suggesting another.

s

Vizquez, supra note 2, at 260.

4

An example of a situation where it did not appears in Freedman, supra note 2, at 239-40

(discussing Hurst litigations in Florida).
I noted in my article that the Supreme Court, citing the Supremacy Clause, has long held in
in state
strong language that the state courts have an obligation to enforce federal constitutional rights

5

habeas proceedings. See Freedman, supranote 2, at 223 n.68 (citing Robb v. Connolly, 11I U.S. 624,
635-39 (1884)).
6

Vazquez, supra note 2, at 260.

7

Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 731-32.
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(1) Professor Vizquez's thought is that the Teague v. Lanes exception for
substantive new rules that Montgomery constitutionalized (1) originates in the Due
Process Clause, and (2) consists of a prohibition on the incarceration of the legally
innocent.9 On this account, there would be no justification for a different rule
respecting the obligations of the state and federal courts, since both are bound by
the Due Process Clause.
But in order for this suggestion to lead to the adoption of my definition of
"substantive," a court would have to conclude that the Supreme Court has to date
been unconstitutionally exiguous in its interpretation of that term under Teague.
One might reasonably question whether this is likely to happen. Those seeking to
expand the rights of state prisoners to assert federal claims in federal court are
likely to find more success in arguing for modification of Teague as a prudential,
not constitutional, matter.' 0
(2) My suggestion is that the constitutional right of state prisoners to assert
federal claims in state habeas corpus proceedings, which the Supremacy Clause
enforces, originates in the oft-marginalized Privileges or Immunities Clause of the
14 th Amendment: "No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States.""
In the wake of Slaughter-House,1 2 the set of "privileges or immunities" that
the states are forbidden to abridge is tiny, but-as all the Justices sitting on that
case agreed-the right to bring a habeas corpus petition asserting a violation of
federal rights is one of them.1 3 The details of the obligations that this antiabridgment mandate imposes on the state courts are beyond the scope of this short
comment. Whatever they may be, the point for Supremacy Clause purposes is that
the 14th Amendment's Privileges or Immunities Clause contains a declaration of
federal policy that state post-conviction courts hear claims of violations of federal
constitutional rights. That policy, which does not originate in the Due Process
8

Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989).

9

Vazquez, supra note 2, at 259-60.

10

See Freedman supra note 2, at 217 n.40, 218 n.44.

"

U.S. CoNST. amend. XIV, § 1.

2 Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1872).
3 See Lee Kovarsky, Prisoners and Habeas Privileges Under
the Fourteenth Amendment, 67
VAND. L. REV. 609, 638-639 (2014) (summarizing Justices' opinions and concluding, "the
proposition that the P1 Clause included the habeas privilege commanded unanimous support.") The
Court's unanimity makes entire sense because one of the evils the framers of the 141 Amendment
sought to remedy was that prior to the Civil War the states had failed to enforce federal constitutional
guarantees. Thus, in a famous speech on May 10, 1866, the House sponsor of the Amendment,
Representative John Bingham, declared, "no state ever had the right ... to abridge the privileges or
immunities of any citizen of the Republic, although many of them have assumed and exercised that
power, and that without remedy." CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2542 (1866).
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Clause and which imposes different obligations on the state courts than the federal
new
ones, justifies my conclusion that, under the Supremacy Clause, the set of
given
be
requires
Montgomery
that
"substantive" federal constitutional rights
retroactive application on collateral review is broader in state court than in federal
one.
B. Enhancingthe States' Retroactivity Doctrines
4
Professor Vazquez's comment also makes a valuable interim suggestion
which I would elaborate into the following proposal. Unless there has been some
affirmative post-Montgomery holding to the contrary by the state's highest court,
each state's retroactivity doctrine should be read as a matter of state law to provide
at minimum for retroactive collateral relief when the state recognizes a new federal5
or state constitutional right that is "substantive" under the definition in my article.'
Implementation of this proposal can and should happen now. There is no need
to await a definitive articulation of how extensive a definition of "substantive" is
required by the Constitution because the proposal does not depend on a federal
constitutional command. Rather, it recognizes-and will be a transitional step
towards achieving-the structural benefits to our system of criminal adjudication
that were the ultimate goal of my article.

III. CONCLUSION

I conclude by again expressing my appreciation to Professor Vazquez for his
thoughtful assistance in strengthening my project.

4 Vdzquez, supra note 2, at 260-61.

s

See Freedman, supranote 2, at 244-248.

